Two things about the attempted car bombings and the airport attack in Great Britain.

First, a lot of attention is being paid to the fact that “All eight people arrested in the aftermath of two bungled car bombings here last week are from the medical profession.” The tendency for the past few years (both in the media and within academia) has been to assume that religious violence is an outgrowth of other social factors. The assumption is that it’s a function of feeling oppressed, or of having limited opportunities, or of being in a low socio-economic bracket. While these no doubt contribute to the motivation to perpetrate violence, they do not trump what I think is the fundamental aspect of the violence: its grounding in religious belief.

There is something particular about the terrorist acts committed by Islamic extremists and this particularity is the religious dimension of the violence. I tend to agree with scholars like Mark Juergensmeyer that view religious terrorism as a symbolic and performative act. It is not meant to accomplish a strategic goal but rather meant to announce that those committing the violent act will not tolerate the way things are in a particular country, or in the world.

Of course, despite the discussion of how surprising it is that the suspects are all in the medical profession, there is no speculation on religious motivation, only bewilderment. “Even if I were to come across my enemy, my duty is to heal the sick…How could I remotely plan to kill and maim innocent people? I have no words to describe this,” said the chairman of the British International Doctors Association in the Times article cited above. The Washington Post takes a similar angle:

Mohammed Shafiq, 28, spokesman for the Ramadhan Foundation, a leading Muslim youth organization, said it was “absolutely baffling” that doctors — professionals with good jobs and income — would be involved in violent extremism. He said Muslim leaders have been most concerned about the radicalization of disaffected and unemployed youth, and they have been urging the government to help them find jobs.

Religious belief runs deeper than socio-economic factors, and while being poor may drive someone to religion, so might a whole host of other factors. Now the second point: what does this mean for terrorism in the United States?

Op-Ed columnist for the Washington Post Eugene Robinson, posits two possible reasons why we haven’t seen a U.S. attack in almost six years. First, al-Qaeda is planning something bigger, and not wasting its time with smaller operations. Second, the U.S. does a better job of integrating its Muslim citizens than Europe.

While the second point may be true, the suspects in the Great Britain plot/attack were foreign born. Furthermore, what does “well integrated” in the U.S. mean? Granted, the Pew Forum report specifically addresses American Muslims’ feelings about extremism, but still when we think of the difference between U.S. and European Muslim populations it comes down to socio-economic status. U.S. Muslims are middle class families. European Muslims are “disaffected and unemployed” young adults. But when we see doctors perpetrating the terrorism, where does this leave our analysis? We can’t pigeonhole suspects into a particular social class or as coming from a particular educational background. This seems to be a lesson we are having a difficult time learning.

Regarding the first point, that perhaps al-Qaeda is plotting something larger, I doubt that is the case. The Post also reports that:

The next terrorist assault on the United States is likely to come through relatively unsophisticated, near-simultaneous attacks — similar to those attempted in Britain over the weekend — designed more to provoke widespread fear and panic than to cause major losses of life, U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials believe.

This would be the type of symbolic violence that Juergensmeyer talks about. From the same article:

Although British investigators have not claimed al-Qaeda involvement in the latest incidents, officials here said they may constitute a “hybrid” phenomenon, in which al-Qaeda inspires and guides local groups from afar but establishes no visible operational or logistical links.

My feeling is that this accurately characterizes what happened in Great Britain and, moreover, the future of Islamic terrorism. The 9/11/06 issue of The New Yorker ran a story by Lawrence Wright titled “The Master Plan: What will the next stage of jihad be?” The article described Abu Musab al-Suri, a Syrian theorist of jihad whose goal was to “codify the doctrines that animated Islamist jihad, so that Muslim youths of the future could discover the cause and begin their own, spontaneous religious war.” In other words, the more organized breed of terrorist organization is now defunct, and the future is terrorist attacks initiated by individuals or autonomous groups. Suri’s teachings were published on the internet in December of 2004, perhaps the theory is finally becoming practice.